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Zero Tolerance for the First Amendment: Title VII's Regulation
of Employee Speech
KINGSLEY

R. BROWNE*

In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,' the Supreme Court ruled that

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 prohibits sexual harassment of the
"hostile environment" variety, stating that employees need not "run a gauntlet
of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work."3 The
Court appeared to endorse the EEOC Guidelines, which describe sexual
harassment as "verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature [that] has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment." 4 Not all speech or conduct that might be labeled "harassment"
is necessarily actionable, however; instead, the Court has said that in order to
be actionable, harassment must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter
the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment." 5 In Meritorand subsequent cases,6 the Supreme Court has held
that employers may, in some circumstances, avoid liability for harassment by
adopting effective anti-harassment policies and taking reasonable corrective
action against harassment that does occur.
Much of the "conduct" that is complained of in harassment cases
constitutes speech or other expression. Sexual jokes, sexual propositions,
sexually explicit pictures or cartoons, and sexist remarks - such as statements
that women should not be doctors or police officers - are common fare in
sexual harassment cases.7 Courts have held that no malicious intent is
necessary on the part of the accused harasser,8 and the Ninth Circuit has stated

* Professor, Wayne State University Law School. The author would like to thank Bob Sedler for
helpful comments on a draft of this article and for our many discussions of the issues discussed herein.
© 2001 Kingsley R. Browne. E-mail: kingsley.browne@wayne.edu.
1. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
3. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 59 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11 th Cir. 1982)).
4. 29C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1999).
5. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
6. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775 (1998).
7. See generally Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship:Hostile-EnvironmentHarassment

and the FirstAmendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481 (1991).
8. Newton v. Dep't of the Air Force, 85 F.3d 595,598 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d
872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991); Katz v. City of Aurora, 85 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (D. Colo. 2000), affid, No. 00-1103,
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15368 (10th Cir. 2001); Harris v. Int'l Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1515 (D. Me.
1991), amended by, 765 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Me. 1991).

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

that even "well-intentioned compliments" may lead to liability. 9 The "severe
or pervasive" limitation of Meritor,designed to ensure that isolated and trivial
incidents do not create liability, is assessed using a "totality-of-thecircumstances" standard.'0
One might have thought it obvious that imposing liability on the basis of
the content of speech raises substantial First Amendment issues, especially
since liability depends in many cases on the viewpoint expressed. That is, a
statement that women should not be doctors or police officers may contribute
to liability, while a statement expressing the opposite opinion would not.
Nonetheless, despite a rich debate that has raged for the last decade in the
academic literature," case law addressing the First Amendment implications
of harassment regulation has been meager. 2
I.

FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINES THAT HAVE BEEN INVOKED TO JUSTIFY
HARASSMENT REGULATION'

If there can be said to be a core principle of First Amendment doctrine,
it is that the government may not impose sanctions against the expression of
particular views because-of the viewpoint expressed. As the Supreme Court
13
stated in Rosenbergerv. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,
"[i]t is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its
substantive content or the message it conveys" and "[w]hen the government
targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject,
the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant."' 4 Given this
principle, how can a court base a liability finding, even in part, on the
statement "there's nothing worse than having to work around women"'" when
it would not do so for the statement "it is a joy to work around women," at
least so long as the latter statement was made in a non-sarcastic manner?
Although a number of commentators, and a few courts, have invoked
previously recognized doctrines that would allow such regulation, none of
these doctrines can, without modification, justify the breadth of harassment

9. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880.
10. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69; Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 660 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating
that a "district court should not carve the work environment into a series of discrete incidents and then
measure the harm occurring in each episode"); Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 564
(8th Cir. 1992) (same).
11. See infra note 77.
12. See discussion infra Section V.
13. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
14. Id. at 828-29.
15. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
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A. Labor Speech
One doctrine that might justify harassment regulation is the "labor
speech" doctrine enunciated in the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co. 7 Gissel upheld a bargaining order against an employer
that had predicted during a representation campaign that selection of the union
could lead to the closing of the employer's plant or transfer of operations if
the union called a strike. 8 The Court viewed this speech as "a threat of
retaliation based on misrepresentation and coercion."' 9 The Court was careful
to note that its ruling did not limit employers' rights to state their opinions,
however. It stated that employers are "free to communicate... [their] general
views about unionism or... a particular union, so long as the communications
2
do not contain a 'threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.""'
Although some have found support for harassment regulation in Gissel,2'
the Court's rationale does not extend so far. The basis for the Gissel decision
was a transactional one: the Court viewed the employer's speech as the
equivalent of "if you vote in the union, I will close down the plant." 22 While
this transactional rationale applies to quid pro quo harassment - "sleep with
me or you are fired" - it does not extend to hostile-environment harassment.
Expressing negative views about women is more analogous to the expression
of negative views about unions, which the Gissel Court said the employer was
free to do.
B. Captive Audience
Related to the labor-speech doctrine is that of the "captive audience."
Many commentators have argued that precedents allowing greater regulation
of speech when the audience is somehow "captive" apply to the workplace

16. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First
Amendment Dog That Didn't Bark, 1994 Sup. CT.REV. I(1994).
17. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
18. Id. at 620.
19. Id. at 618.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Deborah Epstein, Can a "Dumb Ass Woman" Achieve Equality in the Workplace?
Running the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO. LJ.399 (1996); Suzanne
Sangree, Title VII ProhibitionsAgainst HostileEnvironmentSexual Harassmentand the FirstAmendment:
No Collision in Sight, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 461 (1995); Amy Horton, Of Supervision, Centerfolds,and
Censorship:Sexual Harassment,the FirstAmendment, andthe Contoursof Title VII, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV.
400(1991).
22. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 616-20.
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because workers lack the freedom they would enjoy on the street to avoid
offensive speech.23 While serious arguments can be made that captiveaudience doctrine should be extended to encompass harassing speech, the
exception as currently structured does not fit harassment cases.24
Most captive-audience cases have emphasized the sanctity and
uniqueness of the home.2"
In Rowan v. United States Post Office
Department,26 for example, the Court upheld a statute permitting persons
having received advertisements for "sexually provocative" materials to request
the Post Office to require mailers to stop future mailings to the addressee. The
Court stated: "That we are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home
and subject to objectionable speech and other sound does not mean we must
be captives everywhere. ' 27 Although some of the Court's precedents are
subject-matter based, as in Rowan,' none involves viewpoint-based
regulation.
Unlike the laws involved in the Court's captive-audience precedents,
harassment regulation attempts to insulate one captive from the speech of
another captive, for typically the harassing co-worker is no less captive than
his target. Had the statute at issue in Rowan purported to allow any member
of the household to bar entry of sexually provocative materials to the entire
household, the result would likely have been different.29 An analogous
situation is presented by a law that allows one worker to exercise a similar
veto over the possession of sexually suggestive materials or expression of
sexist or sexual remarks in the workplace by all other co-workers.
The captive-audience doctrine could, of course, be expanded to cover
harassment regulation, but there is good reason for caution. As Laurence
Tribe has noted, "The concept of a 'captive audience' is dangerously
encompassing, and the Court has properly been reluctant to accept its
implications whenever a regulation is not content-neutral." 30 Moreover, if
people are captives for First Amendment purposes in their workplaces as well
as in their homes, the "limited exception" to ordinary First Amendment

23. See Epstein, supra note 21; Sangree, supra note 21.
24. See Fallon, supra note 16.
25. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,487 (1988); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S.
728, 737-38 (1970).
26. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
27. Id. at 738.
28. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
29. Justice Brennan's concurrence in Rowan noted that that the Court was leaving open the
constitutionality of the statute's provision allowing a householder to stop mailings to the householder's
children under the age of 19, and suggesting that the provision raised "constitutional problems." Rowan,
397 U.S. at 741 (Brennan, J., concurring).
30. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTULIONAL LAw §§ 12-19, at 950 n.24 (2d. ed. 1988).
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principles becomes the rule, rather than the exception, as the two locales in
which individuals are most likely to engage in discussion of social issues are
extended less than full First Amendment protection.
C. Time, Place,or Manner Regulation
In some circumstances, regulation of the "time, place, or manner" of
speech may be acceptable. 3' Some have argued that workplace harassment
regulation falls within this doctrine because it regulates speech in just one
place - the workplace.32 In order for speech regulation to be justified under
the time, place, or manner doctrine, however, the law must be both content33
neutral and narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.
Harassment law is not content-neutral, and although women's workplace
equality is a significant governmental interest, harassment law - reaching
everything from forcible rape to the vilest obscene epithet to a well-intended
compliment - is anything but narrowly tailored.
D. "Secondary Effects" Doctrine
Speech can sometimes be regulated, even on the basis of content, when
the regulation is directed not at speech itself but rather at its "secondary
effects." The leading case is Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 34 which
upheld a zoning ordinance prohibiting adult theaters from locating near
homes, churches, and schools. The Court held that the ordinance was
permissible because it was aimed at the "secondary effects" of adult theaters
35
- crime, lowered property values, and disintegration of neighborhoods.
According to the Court, the ordinance was not designed to suppress offensive
speech and therefore was not to be subjected to the rigorous review it would
otherwise face.36
Some have argued that harassing speech disadvantages women and
minorities by lowering their self-esteem, interfering with their ability to
perform their jobs, and generally demoralizing them. Because the concrete
harm to employment opportunities is a "secondary effect" of the speech that
is being regulated, the argument goes, harassment regulation is a permissible
restriction on speech under Renton.37 The flaw in this argument is that the

31. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
32. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1535 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
33. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177.
34. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
35. Id. at 50-53.
36. Seeid. at51-52.
37. See Lydia A. Clougherty, Feminist Legal Methods and the FirstAmendment Defense to Sexual
HarassmentLiability, 75 NEB. L. REV. 1 (1996).
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Supreme Court has held that "listeners' reactions to speech" are not the kind
of "secondary effects" discussed in Renton.38 It is precisely the listeners'
reactions that are of concern in harassment cases - either women's reactions
to hostile speech that impairs their ability to function in the workplace or coworkers' reactions to the speech that may lead them to view women as
primarily sexual creatures rather than co-workers of equal status.
E. Fighting Words
Yet another class of speech that has been held to be entitled to lesser
protection is, as the Court recognized in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,3 9 "the
insulting or fighting words - those which by their very utterance inflict injury
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."' Although harassing
words could be said to inflict injury "by their very utterance" - as could
virtually all other speech that is deemed harmful - the Court since Chaplinsky
has relied on the breach-of-the-peace rationale rather than the "injurious in
themselves" rationale.
Very little harassing expression fits within the definition of "fighting
words," as most would not tend to incite a breach of the peace. Moreover, the
selectivity of the fighting words that- are prohibited tends to undercut an
argument that the purpose of the regulation is to preserve the peace, and the
standard for assessing a hostile-environment does not make the likelihood of
a breach of the peace particularly relevant.
In sum, none of the existing First Amendment doctrines that have been
relied upon by commentators can justify the broad regulation of workplace
speech. It will be instructive at this point to examine what courts have said
about potential constitutional limitations on harassment regulation.
II.

CASE LAW ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO
HOSTILE-ENVIRONMENT HARASSMENT

Given that workplace speech has been subject to regulation for the last
two decades, it might have been expected that the law's constitutionality
would have been by now well settled. Strangely, however, case law on the
subject remains quite sparse.

38. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334-36 (1988).
39. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
40. id. at 572 (emphasis added).
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A. The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has not yet decided a case involving a First
Amendment challenge to sexual harassment regulation, although it has
4
expressed some views on the subject-in dictum. In R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, '
the Court held unconstitutional a city ordinance defining as disorderly conduct
the display of a symbol, such as a burning cross or swastika, "which one
knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment
in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender. '42 The Supreme
Court held that a regulation of fighting words that is viewpoint-based is
impermissible, even though "fighting words" traditionally had been thought
to be beyond constitutional protection. 43 The Court explained that when it had
previously described categories of expression such as obscenity and fighting
words as being outside the bounds of constitutional protection, it had simply
meant that this expression could be regulated because of its "constitutionally
proscribable content."
That does not mean, the Court stated, that these
categories of expression are subject to "content discrimination unrelated to
their distinctively proscribable content."'
The holding of R.A. V. provides strong support for the view that
viewpoint-based restrictions on so-called harassing speech are impermissible.
After all, in R.A. V., the Court struck down viewpoint-based restrictions on
"fighting words" - that is, speech that had long been thought outside First
Amendment protection - while much speech involved in harassment cases is
clearly within the sphere of First Amendment protection. Indeed, some of the
speech involved in harassment cases - such as expression of negative views
about the participation of women in the workforce - seems like socio-political
speech that is at the core of First Amendment protection.46
Notwithstanding the holding that would appear to call much harassment
regulation into question, the majority in dictum denied that its analysis would
outlaw hostile-environment regulation. The Court stated:

41. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 380.
See id. at381.
Id.at 383.
Id. The concurring Justices also viewed the ordinance as unconstitutional, because it extended

beyond just fighting words to words that would "arouse anger, alarm, or resentment," rejecting the
Minnesota Supreme Court's construction of the statute as extending no farther than prohibition of fighting
words. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 397 (White, J., concurring); id. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at
416 (Stevens, J., concurring).
46. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980) (expression on public issues "has always
rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values"); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64, 74-75 (1964) (speech "concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of selfgovernment").
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Moreover, since words can in some circumstances violate laws
directed not against speech but against conduct (a law against treason,
for example, is violated by telling the enemy the Nation's defense
secrets), a particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable class
of speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute
directed at conduct rather than speech. Thus, for example, sexually
derogatory "fighting words," among other words, may produce a
violation of Title VII's general prohibition against sexual
discrimination in employment practices. Where the government does
not target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not
shielded from regulation merely because they express a
discriminatory idea or philosophy."
One might question whether the R.A. V. dictum is an accurate description
of harassment law. Is it truly fair to say that the EEOC Guidelines' definition
of "verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature [that] has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment"4' is aimed
primarily at nonexpressive conduct and reaches expression only
"incidentally"? In his concurring opinion, Justice White took the majority to
task for this description, stating that "the majority's focus on the statute's
general prohibition on discrimination glosses over the language of the specific
regulation governing hostile working environment, which reaches beyond any
'incidental' effect on speech."'4 9
Even if the R.A. V. dictum is to be taken at face value, however, it will not
save most hostile-environment regulation. The R.A. V. majority spoke of "a
particular content-based subcategory of a proscribableclass of speech"50 that
might be swept up incidentally by a statute regulating conduct. At most, this
language would allow incidental content-based regulation of types of speech,
such as obscenity or fighting words, that have already been given diminished
protection. Current harassment doctrine, however, extends well beyond
"proscribable class[es] of speech" and, as such, is not authorized by R.A. V.
Two terms after R.A. V., the Supreme Court was presented with briefs
raising the First Amendment issue in Harrisv. Forklift Systems, Inc.5' The
Court did not address the issue, leading some to argue that the Court thereby
indicated its lack of sympathy for the argument."2 The Court's failure to
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 389-90 (citations omitted).
29C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1999).
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 410 (White, J.,
concurring).
Id.at 389-90 (emphasis added).
510 U.S. 17 (1993).
Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: UnconstitutionalConditionsandthe Chimeraof Constitutional
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address the issue cannot be taken as a reflection of its views on the merits,
however. The First Amendment issue received only cursory discussion in the
parties' briefs, and was argued primarily by amici. Moreover, the courts
below had not mentioned the issue, and it appears not to have been mentioned
in any of the lower-court briefs. Finally, the First Amendment issue was not
really before the Court in Harris. The question presented in the case was
"whether conduct, to be actionable as 'abusive work environment' harassment
...
must 'seriously affect [an employee's] psychological well-being."' 3 That
question focused on what kinds of harm the plaintiff must suffer rather than
what kind of conduct by a defendant creates liability. Thus, the Court's
refusal to discuss an issue that was so tangential to the case is wholly
unsurprising.
Four dissenting Justices acknowledged First Amendment limitations on
harassment regulation in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,4
although it was not a workplace case. In rejecting the majority's conclusion
that Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 5 should be interpreted
to recognize a private cause of action for peer sexual harassment, Justice
Kennedy (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas)
argued that schools often lack effective control over the expression of their
students. Citing lower-court cases that had struck down university speech
codes, the dissenters stated that a "university's power to discipline its students
sexual harassment is also circumscribed by the
for speech that may5 constitute
6
First Amendment.
Most recently, the Court had before it the petition for certiorari in Avis
Rent a CarSystem, Inc., v. Aguilar.5 7 The petition challenged an injunction
issued by a state court in California in a racial harassment case. The case did
not raise the broad question of whether the First Amendment imposes a
general limitation on harassment doctrine, but rather the narrower question
whether an injunction against racial epithets that was issued following a
finding of liability violated the First Amendment where the employer did not
challenge the liability finding on First Amendment grounds.5 8 The Court
denied the petition. Justice Thomas, however, dissented from the denial,
stating that "[a]ttaching liability to the utterance of words in the workplace is

Consistency, 72 DENY. U. L. REv. 989, 992 (1995).
53. Harris,510 U.S. at 20.
54. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
55. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994).
56. Davis, 526 U.S. at 667 (5-4 decision) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
57. 529 U.S. 1138(2000).

58. Id. at 1139-40.
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likely invalid for the simple reason that this speech is fully protected
speech."'59
B. Lower-Court Cases Supporting the FirstAmendment Argument
A number of lower-court cases have dealt with the constitutionality of
speech regulation in contexts somewhat analogous to harassment cases. For
example, several cases have struck down hostile-environment harassment
policies of public universities' or school districts6' on First Amendment
grounds. Also, in Hendersonv. City ofMurfreesboro,62 the court held that the
defendant City had violated an artist's First Amendment rights when it took
down her painting of a naked woman from the City Hall, even though the City
had argued that because the City Hall is a "workplace," it needed to take down
the painting to comply with sexual harassment law. 63
None of the above cases involved a defensive assertion of the First
Amendment in a harassment action. Some courts have acknowledged that
harassment regulation of private employers raises serious First Amendment
issues but have found it unnecessary to reach the issue. Fer example, the First
Amendment issue was raised defensively in DeAngelis v. El Paso Municipal
Police Officers Association." However, the court held that the challenged
statements in an Association newsletter that were critical of both the plaintiff
in particular and women police officers in general were not sufficiently severe
or pervasive to constitute actionable harassment.65 Consequently, it did not
reach the "difficult question whether Title VII may be violated
by expressions
''
of opinion published in... the Association's newsletter. 6
C. Lower Court Cases Supporting Regulation of HarassingSpeech
There is an even larger body of cases expressly rejecting the First
Amendment argument, the first of which was Robinson v. Jacksonville

59. Id. at 1140-41 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
60. Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995); Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi
Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1993); UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents, 774
F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
61. Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001).
62. 960 F. Supp. 1292 (M.D. Tenn. 1997).
63. Id.
64. 51 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 1995).
65. Id. at 595-96.
66. Id. at 596. The court characterized the Supreme Court's "offhand pronouncements" in R.A. V.
as "unilluminating." Id. at 597. See also Baliko v. Stecker, 645 A.2d 1218 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994)
(acknowledging the tension between the First Amendment and harassment law, but declining to resolve it
because of an inadequate record and lack of full briefing).
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Shipyards, Inc.67 In the space of approximately two pages out of a 54-page

opinion, the court addressed the First Amendment issue and rejected it on six
independent grounds: (1) the defendant was not expressing itself through
speech of employees; (2) expression is not protected because it is
"discriminatory conduct"; (3) regulation is merely a time, place, or manner
restriction; (4) employees are a "captive audience"; (5) sexual equality is a
compelling interest and the regulation is narrowly tailored; and (6) workplace
speech of private employees may be regulated by analogy to workplace speech
of public employees.68
It seems doubtful that anyone would suggest that the Robinson court was
correct on each of its grounds, although some agree with the opinion on some
of the grounds. The suggestion that the First Amendment defense cannot be
raised by the employer because the speech of the employees was not the
speech of the employer is bizarre. According to that reasoning, a law holding
parents liable for the speech of their children could not be challenged on First
Amendment grounds by parents in an enforcement action. Moreover, because
the law requires affirmative steps by the employer to stifle the speech of their
employees, the employers' own First Amendment interests are implicated.69
The court's bland pronouncement that harassing speech is not speech at all,
but rather conduct, would validate almost any regulation of speech. The
"time, place, or manner" and "captive audience" doctrines have been
discussed already, and, as stated before, cannot in their current form justify
the viewpoint-based speech restrictions embodied in hostile-environment
doctrine. Finally, the analogy to public employees is wholly misplaced. The
Supreme Court has held that the government as employer has greater latitude
in regulating the speech of employees than the government does when it is
acting in its capacity as a regulator. Consequently, robust constitutional
protection of public-employee speech comes into play only when the speech
is a matter of "public concern." 70 To suggest that because the government as
employer may regulate speech, the government as regulator may do so as well,
is an unwarranted bootstrapping argument that has no basis in Supreme Court
precedent.

67. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
68. Id. at 1534-36.
69. Cf Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 705 (1977) (holding that the state may not
"constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by
displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the express purpose that it be observed and read
by the public"). If the First Amendment protects an individual against coerced dissemination of a message,
it should also protect against coerced censorship.
70. See Lawrence Rosenthal, PermissibleContent DiscriminationUnderthe FirstAmendment: 77Te
Strange Case of the Public Employee, 25 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 529 (1998).
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Notwithstanding the skeletal analysis provided by the Robinson court,
other courts have invoked Robinson as a basis for rejecting the First
Amendment argument. The Tenth Circuit, for example, largely without
analysis, rejected the defense stating that it "agree[s] with the reasoning of the
Robinson court." 7 Similarly, the District Court for the District of Columbia
rejected the defense in a footnote, citing Robinson.72
A few cases have rejected the First Amendment argument on other
grounds. For example, a District Court in Minnesota rejected the argument
in a footnote, citing R.A. V., an opinion which, as discussed before, does not
justify rejection of the First Amendment defense in most contexts.73
Similarly, the New Jersey Superior Court rejected the argument on the ground
that the harassment involved was not "solely verbal."7 4 The Supreme Court
of California considered and rejected the First Amendment defense in Aguilar
v. Avis Rent a CarSystem, Inc., but the posture of the case was somewhat
unusual, given the employer's failure to challenge the constitutionality of the
underlying finding of liability.
D. Why the Dearthof First-AmendmentAnalysis in the Cases?
A consistent characteristic of courts addressing the First Amendment
issue is that their discussions tend to be skeletal at best. The failure of courts
to pay serious attention to the First Amendment argument is puzzling. In other
contexts, judges seem eager to address broad constitutional issues as a
welcome respite from the day-to-day tedium of routine cases.76 Yet most
courts have declined to give more than cursory attention to the First
Amendment issue. One can only speculate as to the cause of their reticence.
The most obvious reasons are either that courts simply believe that the issue
is a frivolous one, unworthy of serious attention, or else they think that it is a
serious issue but are unsure how to justify on doctrinal grounds their intuition
that the First Amendment defense should be rejected. Surely, the Tenth
Circuit, which rejected the defense simply by stating its agreement with the
Robinson opinion, could not have believed that all of the grounds given in the
Robinson opinion were meritorious.

71. Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1247 (10th Cir. 1999).
72. Berman v. Washington Times Corp., No. 92-2738 (WBB), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16476, at *10
n.4 (D. D.C. 1994).
73. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 884 n.89 (D. Minn. 1993) (citing R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992)).
74. Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods, 675 A.2d 684, 694 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
75. 980 P.2d 846 (Cal. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1138 (2000).
76. See R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 415 (noting "the frequently irresistible impulse of judges to tinker with
the First Amendment") (White, J., concurring).
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The suggestion that it is the considered judgment of courts that the issue
is frivolous is difficult to credit. Over the last ten years, scores of law review
articles have been written dealing with the subject, and opinions of
commentators range from the suggestion that hostile-environment regulation
presents grave First Amendment issues to the suggestion that with some
moderate amount of "tweaking" of either First Amendment doctrine or
harassment doctrine the two can be reconciled to the suggestion that current
First Amendment doctrine presents no impediment at all to broad regulation
of workplace speech." The argument that hostile-environment regulation

77. A partial list of articles devoted specifically to the First Amendment and workplace speech
follows. It is important to note that this long list does not include the many articles that are only partially
devoted to the issue and does not include the large number of articles dealing with the related issues of
hostile-environment regulation in schools and criminal regulation of "hate speech." Mary Becker, How Free
Is Speech at Work?, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 815 (1996); David E. Bernstein, AntidiscriminationLaws and
the FirstAmendment, 66 Mo. L. REv. 83 (2001); Kingsley R. Browne, Workplace Censorship:A Response
to ProfessorSangree, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 579 (1995); Browne, supra note 7; James A. Burns, Sexual
Harassmentas Free Speech: Comment on Article by Kingsley Browne, 17 EMP. REL. L.J. 693 (1992);
Charles R. Calleros, Title VII and the FirstAmendment: Content-NeutralRegulation, DisparateImpact,
and the "Reasonable Person", 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217 (1997); Charles R. Calleros, Title VII and Free
Speech: The FirstAmendment Is Not Hostile to a Content-Neutral Hostile Environment Theory, 1996
UTAH L. REV. 227 (1996); Clougherty, supra note 37; Sonali Das, Silencing Speech in the Workplace:
Re-examining the Use of Specific Speech Injunctive Relieffor Title VII Hostile Environment Work Claims,
34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 321 (2000); Epstein, supra note 21; Cynthia L. Estlund, PropterHonoris
Respectum: The Architectureof the FirstAmendment andthe Case of Workplace Harassment,72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1361 (1997); Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom ofExpression in the Workplace and the Problem
of DiscriminatoryHarassment,75 TEX. L. REV. 687 (1997); Fallon, supranote 16; Keith R. Fentonmiller,
Note. Verbal Sexual Harassmentas Equality-Depriving Conduct, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 565 (1994);
James H. Fowles Ill, Note, Hostile Environmentandthe FirstAmendment: What Now After Harris andSt.
Paul?, 46 S.C. L. REV. 471 (1995); Jules B. Gerard, The FirstAmendment in a Hostile Environment: A
Primeron Free Speech andSexual Harassment,68 NOTRE DAME L REV. 1003 (1993); Kimball E. Gilmer
& Jeffrey M. Anderson, Zero Tolerancefor God?: ReligiousExpression in the Workplace After Ellerthand
Faragher, 42 How. LJ. 327 (1999); Amy Horton, Of Supervision, Centerfolds, and Censorship: Sexual
Harassment,the FirstAmendment, and the Contoursof Title VII, 46 U. MIAM L REV. 403 (1991); David
M. Jaffe, Walking the Constitutional Tightrope: Balancing Title VII Hostile Environment Sexual
HarassmentClaims with FreeSpeech Defenses, 80 MINN. L. REV. 979 (1996); Debbie N. Kaminer, When
Religious Expression Creates a Hostile Work Environment: The Challenge of Balancing Competing
FundamentalRights, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 81 (2000-2001); Jessica M. Kamer, Political
Speech, Sexual Harassment,anda Captive Workforce, 83 CAL. L. REV. 637 (1995); Aileen V. Kent, Note,
FirstAmendment Defense to Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment:Does Discriminatory Conduct
Deserve ConstitutionalProtection?,23 HOFsTRA L. REV. 513 (1994); Mark N. Mallery & Robert Rachal,
Report on the Growing Tension Between the FirstAmendment and HarassmentLaw, 12 LAB. LAW. 475
(1997); Shannon McAuliffe, Speak no Evil: The First Amendment Offers no Protectionfor Sexual
Harassers,29 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 233 (1995); Pamela F. Mucklow, Title VII as the Regulation of the
Secondary Effects of Speech, 46 LAB. L.J. 301 (1995); Ellen R. Peirce, Reconciling Sexual Harassment
Sanctionsand Free Speech Rights in the Workplace, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 127 (1996); Juan F. Perea,
Strange Fruit: Harassment and the First Amendment, 29 U.C. DAviS L. REV. 875 (1996); Wayne L.
Robbins, Jr., When Two Liberal Values Collide in an Era of "PoliticalCorrectness":First Amendment
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violates the First Amendment ultimately may not carry the day, but few who
have examined the issue in detail appear to believe that it is frivolous.
It seems more likely that the intuition of many judges is that the First
Amendment argument is wrong but that they cannot, in the context of current
First Amendment cases, say why it is wrong or they cannot declare it wrong'
without establishing precedent that would be unwelcome in other contexts.
Failing to analyze an issue because the justification for one's position is
elusive, however, is an abdication of judicial responsibility.
So, what might be behind an intuition that the First Amendment ought
not to interfere with regulation of speech in the workplace, and why can't that
intuition be squared with First Amendment doctrine? The fact that harassment
doctrine does not fit easily within existing First Amendment "cubbyholes" has
already been discussed, but there may be other, more impressionistic, grounds
for courts' intuition - reasons that may seem meritorious on first impression
but that will not withstand scrutiny under existing law.
Perhaps the initial reaction is simply to assume that there is no "state
action" for constitutional purposes when private employers censor the speech
of their employers. Although a few commentators have suggested the absence
of state action,78 for the most part the existence of state action is
uncontroversial even among commentators who are generally sympathetic to
harassment regulation. 79 The state-action appears in two places. First, it
Protectionas a Check on Speech-Based Title VII Hostile Environment Claims, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 789
(1995); Sangree, supra note 21; Sangree, infra note 78; Jeffrey A. Steele, Fighting the Devil with a DoubleEdged Sword: Is the Speech-Invoked Hostile Work Environment Hostile to O'Brien?, 72 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 83 (1994); Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1990);
Nadine Strossen, The Tensions Between Regulating Workplace Harassmentand the First Amendment: No
Trump, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 701 (1995); Nadine Strossen, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace:
Accommodating Free Speech and Gender Equality Values, 31 FREE SPEECH Y.B. 1 (1993); NadinC
Strossen, Regulating Workplace Sexual Harassment and Upholding the First Amendment: Avoiding a
Collision, 37 VILL. L. REV. 757 (1992); Joan Kennedy Taylor, Sexual Harassment and the First
Amendment, 4 CoMM. LAW CONSPECTUS 189 (1996); Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work
Environment" Harassment Law Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627 (1997); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech,
Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417 (1996); Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech and Appellate Review in Workplace Harassment Cases, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1009
(1996); Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 563 (1995);
Eugene Volokh, Freedom ofSpeech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992).
78. See, e.g., Suzanne Sangree, A Reply to Professors Volokh and Browne, 47 RUTGERS L REV.
595, 604 n.23 (1995) (stating that "Professor Browne also seems to overlook the fact that a private
employer's efforts to comply with Title VII does not constitute the type of state action needed to sustain an
employee's First Amendment claim. Employees clearly have First Amendment claims only when their
employer is the government or when their free speech is infringed by a court order"). See also Horton, supra
note 21, at 419.
79. Estlund, supra note 77, at 689 (stating that "when the law condemns employee speech and
effectively compels employers to regulate it, as in the case of Title Vll's law of discriminatory harassment,
we cross the state action threshold and confront constitutional issues") (footnote omitted). See also J. M.
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exists when a court imposes liability on a defendant in a harassment action,
just as it exists when a court imposes liability on a defendant in a defamation
action." Second, even before a court is involved, state action exists in Title
VII's mandate to employers to censor their employers, as a governmental
mandate to private parties constitutes state action.8
One way the state-action issue is smuggled into the discussion is when
it is argued that private employees have no free speech rights in the workplace
(or that their speech rights are already so restricted that a little more restriction
should not be a cause of concern).8 2 Those who make this argument typically
invoke the public-employee cases to argue that while the speech of public
employees is entitled to a measure of protection (that is, when they are
speaking about matters of public concern), private employees have no similar
protection.83 This argument seriously misapprehends Supreme Court doctrine.
Contrary to what many appear to believe, the First Amendment provides
greater protection to the speech of private employees than it does to the
speech of public employees, as long as First Amendment protection is
properly characterized. The speech of private employees is entitled tofull
constitutional protection from governmental regulation, while the speech of
public employees is entitled only to partial protection - that is, their
expression is protected when they speak on matters of public concern but not
otherwise. 4 The power of the government to regulate public employee speech
is based upon the fact that "the government as employer.. . has far broader
powers than does the government as sovereign,"85 because its "interest in
achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from
a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant one
when it acts as employer."86 It is true that only public employees have First
Amendment protection from speech regulation by their employers, but that is

Balkin, FreeSpeech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295,2299 (1999); Epstein, supra note
21, at 451 n.5.
80. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also Browne, supra note 7, at 510-11.
81. Cf Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614-16 (1989) (holding that
regulations requiring private railroads to test employees for drugs were subject to Fourth Amendment
challenge).
82. Sangree, supra note 78, at 603; see also Becker, supranote 77.
83. For example, Cynthia Estlund has argued that "[employees in the private sector do not enjoy
even the limited constitutional right of freedom of expression at the workplace that public employees have,
for their employers' actions are not state action." Cynthia L. Estlund, FreeSpeech and Due Processin the
Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. 101, 129-30 (1995). That statement is true only to the extent that it is understood
to mean that private employees have no constitutional protection from restrictions on their speech by their
employers when the employer adopts the restriction voluntarily without governmental coercion.
84. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
85. Waters v. Churchill 5 11 U.S. 661,671 (1994).
86. Id. at 675.
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not because private employees' speech is not protected from government
regulation but because the First Amendment regulates only governmental
speech restrictions. When the government acts as regulator - as it does when
it restricts the speech of private-sector employees - its power to regulate
speech is substantially less than when it acts as employer.87
Because the argument that the public-employee speech cases justify
regulation of private-employee speech is untenable (notwithstanding the
Robinson court's contention to the contrary), the argument may then devolve
to the suggestion that because private employers may freely regulate the
speech of their employees, regulation by the government is more justifiable
than it otherwise would be. Again, however, that argument has no doctrinal
support, which may account for its absence in reported cases. Parents heavily
regulate the speech of their children (at least they try), but the fact of parental
regulation does not expand the government's power to regulate the speech of
children. Moreover, if one of the reasons to deny the government power to
regulate speech is to prevent the establishment of a state-sponsored orthodoxy,
then the fact that hundreds of thousands of employers regulate the speech of
their employees in hundreds of thousands of different ways is less problematic
than a government requirement that they all regulate the speech of their
employees in the same way.
Another intuition behind the apparent failure to take the First
Amendment issue seriously may be that the First Amendment is not important
because many harassment cases involve mixtures of speech and conduct. The
First Amendment issue may not seem important except in those cases that
involve only speech. That rationale was explicitly adopted by the court in
8 in which the court
Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods,"
rejected the First
Amendment argument on the ground that the harassment complained of was
not "solely verbal." 9 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in DeAngelis v. El Paso
Municipal Police Officers Ass'n,9 while not reaching the First Amendment
issue because it found that the complained-of speech did not satisfy the
"severe or pervasive" standard, suggested that there were serious First
Amendment issues because "pure expression" was involved.9' The court

87. It should be noted that the distinction is not merely between public and private employers.
When a municipal government, for example, restricts the speech of its employees because Title VII, a
federal law, requires it to, the federal government's interest in an efficient work force does not extend to
the municipal employees. Thus, these employees are in the same position as private-sector employees: their
speech can be regulated by federal law only to the extent that the federal government's interest as regulator
authorizes it.
88. 675 A.2d 684 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
89. Id. at 694.
90. 51 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 1995).
91. Id. at 596.
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continued: "It is no use to deny or minimize this problem because, when Title
VII is applied to sexual harassment claims founded solely on verbal insults,
pictorial or literary matter, the statute imposes content-based, viewpointdiscriminatory restrictions on speech."'
Although the "not solely verbal" argument may have a certain superficial
appeal, it is inconsistent with existing precedent. In NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware,93 the Court held that a judgment against the NAACP based upon
a boycott of white-owned businesses violated the First Amendment even
though the boycott was effected in part by physical force against potential
customers." Because the state-court judgment might have been based upon
protected speech as well as unprotected conduct, the judgment was invalid.
The "ambiguous" findings of the state court "were inadequate to assure the
'precision of regulation' demanded by [the First Amendment]. 'g Thus,
according to the Court, a judgment that rests, or might rest, in part upon
protected expression is invalid. As a result, the issue in a harassment case is
not whether all of the expression forming the basis for the claim is protected;
rather, the question is whether any of it is.
The risk that a judgment might be based in part on protected speech is
particularly acute in harassment cases. The hostile-environment standard
requires an examination of the "totality of the circumstances" to determine
whether the behavior is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and
conditions of employment. In most cases, a single act of harassment is
insufficient to support liability. Thus, where a case involves both unprotected
conduct and protected expression, it may be the protected expression that
takes the case over the "severe or pervasive" threshold. Alternatively, in the
broad range of cases in which there is enough unprotected expression that a
trier-of-fact could impose liability but not enough that it must, there is a risk
that liability will be imposed precisely because of the protected expression.
This risk is heightened by the fact that expressions of bigotry will tend to
support the view that the speaker is a "bad person," making a finding of
liability that much easier.
These suggestions about courts' possible reasons for not dealing head-on
with the First Amendment issues are speculative, of course, and they may not
be right. Some explanation is necessary, however, to account for the courts'
failure to take this very serious issue seriously.
Not all of the responsibility rests with the courts, however, as it appears
that the First Amendment defense is raised only rarely by employers. That

92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 596-97 (emphasis added).
458 U.S. 886 (1982).
See id.
Id. at 921.
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fact also requires some explanation. Part of the reason may simply be that
attorneys who defend private-sector employers are not used to thinking in
constitutional terms. Another reason may be that they also are implicitly
adopting the "not solely verbal" argument, and do not raise the argument when
there is ample nonverbal conduct alleged in addition to the speech, not
realizing the constitutional objections to liability based even in part on
protected speech. Moreover, employers may be somewhat reluctant to "hide
behind the First Amendment," perceiving that strategy as suggesting that they
have a "right" to harass their employees.
Rather than raising specific objections to application of hostileenvironment law, employers might be better advised to challenge the very
foundations of the regime. An examination of the functioning of hostileenvironment regulation demonstrates how it acts as an extraordinarily broad
limitation on employee speech. The next section will discuss how features of
hostile-environment doctrine act to compel employers to restrict employee
speech and the predictable employer response to those incentives.
IR. HOSTILE-ENVIRONMENT REGULATION RESULTS IN AN OVERBROAD
RESTRICTION OF EMPLOYEE SPEECH

A. Three Features of Hostile-EnvironmentLaw Coalesce to Pressure
Employers to Impose Broad Speech Restrictions: Vagueness, the
Totality-of-the-CircumstancesStandard,and Third-PartyLiability
The focus on doctrinal categories of speech entitled to lesser protection
- and indeed the entire notion of "protected" and "unprotected" speech - often
obscures an important point about First Amendment doctrine. Although the
term "protected speech" is commonly used - indeed, it is used in this article
- it is misleading in important ways. The First Amendment does not, strictly
speaking, protect speech; rather, it prohibits (some) governmental regulation
of speech. There is no speech that is protected under all circumstances, and
there is no speech that is unprotected under all circumstances. The critical
issue is the nature of the regulation. A political speech advocating the election
of a certain presidential candidate is at the core of First Amendment values,
but if it is given in the middle of a courtroom or an intensive-care unit it may
properly be prohibited. Are statements intended and likely to cause an
imminent breach of the peace protected by the First Amendment? They likely
fall within the category of "fighting words," but, as R.A. V. held, the
government may not make viewpoint-based decisions about which fighting
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words to prohibit.96 Naturally, none of the speech is "protected" by the First
Amendment against purely private infringement.
The concept of protected and unprotected speech causes the discussion
of harassment regulation to proceed in unproductive directions. The assertion
that it is unconstitutional to hold an employer liable for the speech of its
employees is sometimes met by responses such as "Well, wouldn't you agree
that if a co-worker/supervisor said X to a female employee every day for Y
years that the speech would not be protected?" or "What if instead of saying
X to the employee, the co-worker/supervisor said Z? Surely that is not
protected." The appropriate answer is that whatever the nature of the
hypothetical speech, it is actionable only pursuant to an appropriately tailored
regulation. That regulation must give sufficient notice of what speech is
prohibited and must not extend substantially beyond the boundaries of
regulable speech. The core problem of harassment regulation - even if
categories of regulable speech were modified to cover workplace speech - is
that it does not, and perhaps cannot even if modified, satisfy these
requirements.
1. The Vagueness of the Standard Leaves Employers Unsure about
What Speech They Should Restrict
The hostile-environment standard provides little notice of what speech
speakers should avoid or what speech employers must restrict. The EEOC
Guidelines prohibit "verbal ... conduct of a sexual nature [that] has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment." 97 When a supervisor must decide whether an employee must
be told not to say something to another employee, the legal standard is of very
little assistance. Justice Scalia recognized this indeterminacy in his concurring
opinion in Harrisv. Forklift Systems, Inc., where he noted that the standard
lets "virtually unguided juries decide whether sex-related conduct engaged in
(or permitted by) an employer is egregious enough to warrant an award of
damages." '98 The legal consequences of a finding that the law is vague will be
discussed in Section IV, below. For now, suffice it to say that the predictable
behavioral response to a vague liability standard is to err on the side of caution
and stifle more, rather than less, expression.

96. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
97. 29C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1999).
98. 510 U.S. 17, 24 (1993).
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2. The Problem of Vagueness is Exacerbated by the Totality-ofthe-Circumstances Standard
Vagueness is a potential problem with any restriction on speech, but the
vagueness problem is exacerbated by the totality-of-the-circumstances
standard. Whether a given statement is actionable turns not just on the nature
of that statement but also on all other statements that a plaintiff might rely
upon in subsequent litigation. Thus, an employer cannot know whether a
given expression is ultimately going to form a basis for liability without
knowing what else has already been said and will be said in the future both by
the particular speaker and all other co-workers. The question facing an
employer, therefore, is not whether the complained-of speech creates liability
by itself, but whether that speech might ultimately go into the mix of speech
that forms the totality of the circumstances in a hostile-environment lawsuit.
The employer's situation is easily illustrated. Suppose a female
employee complains that a co-worker told an off-colorjoke, and suppose that
all would agree that the joke, though tasteless, would not by itself create
hostile-environment liability. How should the employer respond? Does the
employer say to the complaining employee "I've read the sexual harassment
case law and can tell you that the joke is not sufficiently severe or pervasive
to constitute sexual harassment; therefore you must put up with it"? Or does
he think "even though this is not sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute
harassment, it could be added in with other things about which I have no
knowledge to make a hostile-environment claim, and if a lawsuit ever comes
I will be judged on the basis of the way I respond to complaints"? Quite
plainly, a well-counseled employer will respond in the latter fashion.
3. The Vague Standard and Employer Liability Combine to
Require Overbroad Regulation by Employers
The vague hostile-environment standard, coupled with the totality of the
circumstances test, is sufficient to pose grave threats to freedom of expression.
There is yet another feature of hostile-environment law that virtually assures
that the law results in an overbroad regulation of speech, that is, that it results
in the suppression of much speech that a constitutionally valid regulation
would not suppress. This feature is the system of third-party liability, under
which employers are responsible for the speech of their employees, or, put
another way, are responsible for failing to stifle the speech of their employees.
No regulation of speech can specify with absolute precision what is
permitted and what is prohibited, other than an itemized list of words that
cannot be said in any context; there is virtually always some "grey area" and
therefore some potential for a "chilling effect." When an individual's speech
is directly punishable, the individual is subjected to countervailing pressures
that tend to minimize the extent to which protected speech is stifled. The
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individual's desire to avoid punishment pushes him away from the line, but his
desire for self-expression pushes him back toward it. That is, the speaker may
think to himself, "I know I might get in trouble for this, but I just have to say
it." Even under a totality-of-the-circumstances standard, as long as he is
responsible for only his own speech, he can make some judgment about
whether everything that he has said, and will probably say in the future,
constitutes actionable harassment.
The calculus changes when a third party is responsible for regulating the
speech and is subject to a substantial penalty for under-regulation. Now, the
incentives become far less symmetrical. The employer, unlike the individual
himself, derives little satisfaction from the speech at issue, but the employer
may be subjected to substantial penalties for failing to restrict the speech.
Thus, the employer may think, "I get no benefit from Joe's speaking his mind
about his views of sexual equality, but if I let him talk, I may pay for it later,
especially since I must worry not only about Joe's speech but the cumulative
total of all other speech that may be complained of later." The employer thus
has every reason to restrict speech and little reason to allow it (other than, at
the extreme, to preserve employee morale).
B. What Are Employers Advised to Do, and How Do They Respond to
this Advice?
It is difficult to imagine how the combination of a vague standard, a
totality-of-the-circumstances test, and third-party liability for failing to censor
speech could do anything other than create a climate in which expression
cannot thrive. Perhaps, though, this is all speculative. Perhaps employers
really do not over-regulate the speech of their employees; perhaps employers
are as interested in promoting the expression of their employees as the
employees are themselves. These are empirical questions, and the answer is
clear: from the "zero-tolerance" policies that employers adopt at the behest of
their lawyers to the often draconian penalties that they mete out for their
violation, employers engage in rampant censorship of employee speech out of
a desire to avoid liability.
1. The Advice Employers Receive Concerning Their
Responsibility for the Speech of Their Employees
Employers consistently receive advice from both lawyers and
enforcement agencies that they should not tolerate any conduct that might be
deemed harassing, which has led to the proud adoption by many employers of
"zero tolerance" policies. For example, the Maryland Commission on Human
Relations has advised that "[b]ecause the legal boundaries are so poorly
marked, the best course of action is to avoid all sexually offensive conduct in
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the workplace."" Similarly, the EEOC attorney who wrote the guidance on
employer liability advised lawyers that harassment policies "should be broadly
written" and that employers "must take steps to nip harassment in the bud."''0
The EEOC itself has also spoken forcefully about employers' obligations to
police their premises to purge them of offensive material. In Merriex v.
Henderson,"' for example, although the EEOC rejected the complainant's
assertion that her complaints about the presence of "offensive KKK material"
on postal property were related to her termination, it went on to say:
Although we do not find discrimination in the context of the removal
action, the agency is reminded of its obligation to provide a work
environment free of discriminatory harassment. The agency is
advised to investigate the claim that racist materials are located on its
premises,
and immediately remove such items if they are in fact
02
found.
Law firm newsletters routinely encourage employers to be aggressive in
policing their workplaces. One advises employers "to routinely audit the
workplace to identify potential problems and remove materials likely to be
found offensive prior to receiving complaints from employees."' 3 Another
advises that because
[s]everal courts have found a hostile work environment based, at least
in part, on the presence in the work place of sexually oriented
calendars, pictures and magazines.., it would make sense for all
employers to inspect their work places carefully for pornographic
material and to remove any potentially offensive material found on
walls or otherwise on public display."
It also advises employers not to "participate even in the slightest way in sexual
harassment," as by advising employees to "[g]et a tougher skin" or by
laughing at "off-color jokes."'0 5

99. Jonathan Rauch, Offices and Gentlemen, NEW REPUBLIC, June 23, 1997, at 22.
100. Nancy Montwieler, EEOCAttorney Advises Employers to Establish ClearAnti-Harassment
Policies,DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 60, March 28, 2000, at A-3.
101. No. 01A00583, 2000 WL683086 (EEOC, May 16,2000).
102. Jd. at *3 n.2; cf Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (holding that a state
"Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth" violated the First Amendment by intimidating booksellers
into stopping the sale of certain "objectionable" [not necessarily obscene] publications, despite the fact that
the Commission relied on only "informal sanctions").
103. Jack, Lyon & Jones, P.A., Wal-Mart Ordered to Pay $50 Million as a Warning Against
Permitting Sexual Harassment,ARK. EMP. LAW LETrER, Nov. 1995.
104. Lois C. Schlissel, What is Sexual Harassment?.- An Overview, at http://www.msek.com/
meyersetdetails.cfm?id=22 (last visited Sept. 4,2001).
105. Id.
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The caution advised by lawyers is not unreasonable. Case law makes
clear that whether employers will be held liable for sexual harassment often
depends in very large part on what steps they have taken to prevent sexual
harassment and to deal with it when it occurs. Sensitivity to the expressive
interests of employees is a legally risky course. For example, in a case
involving the harassment of a white woman who was romantically involved
with, and later married, a black man, the following excerpt from a
memorandum from one supervisor to another was used as evidence against the
employer:
Becky, I'm afraid if Sue is entering into this relationship she had
better be prepared to get snide remarks from just about anyone and
everyone. I don't think inter-marriages are acceptecf in our society
today and although you and I certainly would not say anything, I am
not sure we can keep our staff from saying things. I am not sure that
we could fire them on the basis of their remarks. You had better check
with [the company lawyer] and see if he agrees with what I am
saying.'06
The court found that this memo was "[t]he most convincing evidence of [the
employer's] toleration of the harassment" and "ample evidence of an intent to
discriminate against [plaintiff] on the basis of her race because it shows that
[the employer] would not act against [plaintiffs] harassers due to an
intolerance for interracial relationships." ' 7
The Sixth Circuit has also been quite explicit in describing the legal
obligation of employers to censor their employees. In a racial harassment
case, the court described employers' obligations as follows:
In essence, while Title VII does not require an employer to fire all
"Archie Bunkers" in its employ, the law does require that an
employer take prompt action to prevent such bigots from expressing
their opinions in a way that abuses or offends their co-workers. By
informing people that the expression of racist or sexist attitudes in
public is unacceptable, people may eventually learn that such views
are undesirable in private, as well. Thus, Title VII may advance the
goal of eliminating prejudices and biases in our society.'0 8

106. Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., 621 F. Supp. 244, 259 (N.D. Ind. 1985).
107. Id. at 275.
108. Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345,350 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110
(1989); see also Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 633 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Davis, 858 F.2d at 350);
Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 1990) (same).
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This passage constituted a rebuke to the District Court, which had suggested
limits on the reach of Title VII:
The Archie Bunkers of this world, within limitations, still may assert
their biased view. We have not yet reached the point where we have
taken from individuals the right to be prejudiced, so long as such
prejudice did not evidence itself in discrimination. This Court will
secure plaintiff against discrimination; no court can secure him
against prejudice. The defendant in this case is charged by law with
avoiding all discrimination; the defendant is not charged by law with
discharging all Archie Bunkers in its employ. Absent a showing of
something other than disrespect and prejudice by his fellow workers,
plaintiff cannot'bring himself within the terms of either [Section 1981
or Title VII]."
According to the court of appeals, "[b]y emphasizing the point that an
employer 'is not charged by law with discharging all Archie Bunkers in its
employ,' the district court may erroneously be encouraging the perpetuation
of the status quo." '
The message to employers is clear: if they want to avoid liability for
harassment, they must be vigorous in the suppression of their employees'
speech. The next section illustrates how employers have responded to this
message.
2. The Employer Response to the Liability Regime
All indications are that employers have taken the advice they are given
to heart. Most employers of any size have harassment policies, and most, it
seems, enforce them. Although sexual harassment cases continue to be
brought, these usually reflect the breakdown of an employer's policy rather
than its absence. The magnitude of the response by employers is difficult to
measure. When employers have training workshops for employees, or when
they announce zero-tolerance policies, or even when they discipline or
discharge employees for violating harassment policies, there is usually no
public record of the event.
In contending that harassment law does not result in substantial
restrictions on speech, defenders of the current regime typically point to
decided sexual harassment cases and contend that in those cases where the
employer loses, the speech is usually egregious or coupled with non-

109. Howard v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 388 F. Supp. 603, 606 (S.D. Ohio 1975); see Davis, 858
F.2d at 350.
110. Davis, 858 F.2d at 350 (citation omitted).
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expressive conduct. That is, indeed, often the case. Focusing on decided
cases to assess the impact of the law is misguided, however, because it
assumes that the principal censorship spawned by the law comes in the form
of sanctions in litigation. In fact, most of the censorship is analogous to a
prior restraint: it consists of employers' instructions to employees not to speak
because of employers' fear of liability, rather than punishment of employers
for the speech of their employees after it occurs.
There are relatively few legal cases involving the direct application of
harassment policies against accused harassers. In the overwhelming number
of cases, one imagines, the offending employee is counseled not to do it again,
and he complies with the instruction. If the employee instead is disciplined
or discharged, most employees are without recourse.
If an at-will employee is discharged for violating his employer's sexual
harassment policy, he usually has no legal recourse. The classic statement of
at-will employment is that an at-will employee may be discharged for "good
reason, bad reason, or no reason at all.""' Unless the reason is one that
violates some clear legislative directive - such as the anti-discrimination laws
- or some other clearly enunciated public policy, even an unfairly discharged
at-will employee is simply out of luck. A number of courts have specifically
held that an employer owes no tort duty toward an accused harasser to conduct
a reasonable investigation before discharging him." 2 At least one court has
held that no claim is stated under state law by an assertion that the employer
discharged an at-will employee to insulate itself against a claim of sexual
harassment by another employee even though the employer did not believe
that cause for discharge existed." 3 As a result, unless the employer defames
the employee in a context that deprives it of its good-faith qualified immunity,
the employee is without a remedy." 4
Even employees having implied just-cause protection - of the sort that
may be created by employer policy manuals - may not be protected against
even erroneous application of the employer's policy. An implied just-cause
standard ordinarily protects employees only from arbitrary discharge. The
California Supreme Court has held, for example, that where the accused
harasser enjoys implied just-cause protection,

111.
Slatery v. Northeast Miss. Contract Procurement, Inc., 747 So. 2d 257, 259 (Miss. 1999); see
also Skaggs v. Elk Run Coal Co., 479 S.E.2d 561, 589 (W. Va. 1996).
112. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lane, 31 S.W.3d 282 (Tex. App. 2000); Williams v. Continental
Airlines, Inc., 943 P.2d 10 (Colo. App. 1996); Lambert v. Morehouse, 843 P.2d 1116 (Wash. App. 1993).
113. Mackenzie v. Miller Brewing Co., 608 N.W.2d 331 (Wisc. App. 2000), affd 623 N.W.2d 739
(Wis. 2001).
114. See Wal-MartStores, Inc., 31 S.W.3d at 293 (overturning slander award for plaintiff because
of lack of showing of malice).
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the question critical to defendants' liability is not whether plaintiff in
fact sexually harassed other employees, but whether at the time the
decision to terminate his employment was made, defendants, acting
in good faith and following an investigation that was appropriate
under the circumstances, had reasonable grounds for believing
plaintiff had done so."11 5
Moreover, implied just-cause rules typically impose little limitation on the
kinds of policies that an employer can adopt. Thus, an employer who clearly
informs employees, for example, that no off-color jokes will be tolerated and
that they will result in discharge, may ordinarily follow through on that threat
notwithstanding the employees' just-cause protection.
Only employees with express just-cause protection, such as many union
or public employees, have substantial protection against overzealous
enforcement of sexual harassment policies, and, as we will see below, that
protection is largely procedural. That is, employees may have their
employers' decisions overturned on grounds such as lack of notice,
discriminatory or inconsistent application of policies, or actual innocence, but
it is difficult to overturn an employer's decision on the ground that a clearly
enunciated and consistently applied harassment policy was "too harsh." We
will turn now to an examination of a number of cases where employees have
challenged their discharge or other discipline.
a. At-Will Employees
At-will employees, as mentioned previously, occasionally bring
wrongful-discharge actions. A well-publicized case involved a Miller
Brewing executive who was discharged after he described an episode of
Seinfeld." 6 In the episode in question, the protagonist could not recall the
name of a woman he was going out with; all he could remember was that her
name rhymed with a female sexual anatomical part. It turned out that the
woman's name was Dolores. When the plaintiff described the episode to a
woman in the office, the woman did not understand the joke, so the plaintiff
showed her a dictionary page containing the word "clitoris" (obviously, the
rhyme was a bit off). The woman filed an internal sexual harassment charge,
and the man was discharged." 7 The man sued Miller challenging his
discharge and also raising other claims. He won a multi-million dollar

115. Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int'l, Inc., 948 P.2d 412, 423 (Cal. 1998).
116. See Sexual Harassment:Jury Awards $26 Million to Executive FiredafterDiscussing'Seinfeld'
Episode, DAILY LAB. REP (BNA) No. 137, July 17,1997, at A-I 1.
117. Mackenzie, 608 N.W.2d at 336.
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judgment, only a small part of which was related to his discharge, although the
award was ultimately vacated in its entirety.""
b. Civil Service and Other Public Employees
Public employees often enjoy civil-service protection or constitutional
protection resulting from due-process obligations of their employers, and a
number of them have run afoul of their employer's harassment policies.
-

-

-

-

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

A machinist foreman told a female apprentice that he was from
the "old school" and did not believe that women had any place
in the shipyards, that the apprentice program was a "joke," and
that she should have gotten a "typewriter" job. He was demoted
to machinist." 9
The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB)
sustained the demotion. 0
A Postal Service supervisor addressed a subordinate "on more
than one occasion" as "sweet thing." He was demoted to Letter
Carrier.'
An administrative law judge sustained the charge and
the demotion, but the MSPB reduced the penalty to a
30-day suspension.' 2 2
A Warehouse Worker Foreman said approximately ten times
during a four-year period "that he believed that women in
general were incapable of performing work in the [warehouse]
and that he would never hire a woman." He was subsequently
demoted.' 23
The MSPB upheld the demotion, but the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit overturned it, ruling
that because the employee had not acted on his
attitudes or created a hostile environment, he had not
violated any regulations. 24
An Arizona police officer, upon learning that he scored well on
the Sergeant's exam, e-mailed a friend of his, a civilian woman
in the department, "Now that I am on the Sergeant's List will

Id. at 361.
Curry v. Dep't of the Navy, 13 M.S.P.R. 327 (1982).
Id. at332.
Dubiel v. United States Postal Serv., 54 M.S.P.R. 428 (1992).
Id. at435.
Holland v. Dep't of the Air Force, 31 F.3d 1118, 1118-19 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1121.
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you sleep with me?"' 25 His friend was amused and not at all
offended but she mentioned the message to someone who
reported it to a supervisor. The officer's name was then removed
from the Sergeant's List.'26
He sued alleging deprivation of due process, and the
to the
District Court denied summary judgment
27
employer on the due process claim. 1
c. Union Employees Protectedby Collective Bargaining
Agreements
Arbitration cases are a fertile source of information about the application
of policies, because they often involve discipline less than discharge or even
demotion and so pick up many of the more routine applications of policies.
-

-

-

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

A computer operator brought a copy of National Lampoon
magazine to work. It was found by a female employee who gave
it to a manager. The manager decided that the pictures of
scantily clad women in the magazine violated the company's
sexual harassment policy, and the employee was discharged.
The arbitrator overturned the discharge on the grounds
that the grievant was unaware that the photos were in
the magazine and that the employer had not disciplined
brought such material into the
others who
12
workplace. 1
A leadman at an Oregon manufacturing plant, along with several
other male employees, looked unobtrusively at a copy of
Penthousemagazine containing pictures of local celebrity Tonya
Harding. One of the employees later mentioned the magazine to
a female co-worker, who in turn notified management. The
employee was suspended for three days.
The arbitrator overturned the suspension because the
grievant was a 17-year employee with no disciplinary
compared
history, and his punishment was excessive
129
to others involved in the incident.
A Hispanic woman wore an African print scarf on her head.
Some black employees were offended that she would wear an
African scarf and complained. She was told to remove it

Olive v. City of Scottsdale, 969 F. Supp. 564, 567 (D. Ariz. 1996).
Id. at 567-69.
Id. at 571, 579.
In re RMS Techs., Inc., 94 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 297 (1990).
In re American Mail-well Envelope, 105 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 1209 (1995).
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because it offended her co-employees; when she refused, she
was discharged for insubordination.
The arbitrator overturned the discharge, finding that
the grievant had not meant any racial offense. Despite
that finding, the arbitrator required that the grievant
apologize to all black employees and attend sensitivity
training.' 30

-

-

-

Just before Halloween, an air traffic controller found a piece of
rope in a construction area of the Indianapolis Control Tower.
He tied it in a hangman's noose and hung it over the curtain rod
that cordoned off the construction area. Apparently, no one saw
it, but he admitted he had done it after a second noose (which he
had nothing to do with) appeared and caused a furor among
black employees. Although there was no allegation that he had
any racial motivation (and an arbitrator subsequently found that
he clearly did not), the employee was suspended for two days.
The arbitrator overturned the suspension because he
concluded that the grievant did not understand the
racial significance of the noose. Nonetheless, the
arbitrator approved a written admonishment, because
he believed that "some discipline is appropriate
for
13
instructional and correctional purposes.' '
A female employee wore a "Hooters Restaurant" t-shirt to work.
She was given a written reprimand for violating the employer's
"indecent dress" policy that had been adopted pursuant to its
sexual harassment policy.
The arbitrator ruled that shirt indeed violated the
policy, but he required that the discipline be removed
from the grievant' s record, because she had commonly
worn the shirt without comment before the dress policy
was adopted and was given no notice that it would be
deemed to violate the rule. Also, the company had
failed to discipline another employee who had brought
a tool box with sexually offensive writing to work.'3 2
An employee circulated the "Oakland Ebonics Quiz," a
document that ridiculed "ebonics" in ways that were deemed
racially and sexually offensive, at a time when the subject was
much in the news. His supervisor told him to stop circulating it,

130. In re USCP-WESCO, Inc., 109 LAB. ARB.(BNA) 225 (1997).
131. In re Federal Aviation Administration, 109 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 699 (1997).
132. In re Clarion Sintered Metals, Inc., 110 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 770 (1998).
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at which point he apologized and ripped it up. The employee was
suspended for three days.
The arbitrator was convinced that the grievant was
"acting out of innocent motives and that he was misled
by his supervisors" about the permissibility of his
conduct. The arbitrator upheld the suspension anyway,
stating that "[t]he Grievant must be given a penalty
which impresses on him the seriousness of his
offense."13' 3
A correctional officer distributed a newsletter on the employer's
premises before and after his shift that contained an article
entitled Where Are All the Balls? written by military analyst
David Hackworth. The article was critical of both the
"feminization" of the Army and the "emasculation of America."
Although the grievant gave copies of the newsletter only to
people who welcomed it, a number of women saw copies and
complained to management. The officer was suspended for two
days for violating the employer's sexual harassment policy.
The arbitrator upheld the suspension, rejecting the
union's argument that the newsletter addressed a
matter of public concern. According to the arbitrator,
"the comment on the role of women in combat infantry
was only incidental to the pervasive premise that
women are generally inferior to men and should not
have equal opportunity in the workplace."' 34 The
arbitrator did not explain why a suggestion that women
should not have equal opportunity was not a matter of
public concern. Surely, she would not have held that
a statement expressing the contrary view would be
unprotected.
An employee at a PPG plant had inadvertently not logged off of
a computer, leaving his e-mailbox open, and a female employee
discovered sexual material on the computer. In a plant-wide
investigation, it was discovered that the grievant also had
graphic pictures, in addition to sexual jokes, in his e-mail folder.
The employer discharged him for violation of its sexual

133. In re Pepsi Cola Co., 110 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 803 (1998); see also Victoria Roberts, Attorneys
Say Employees' Use of E-Mail CreatingPossible Legal Pitfallsfor Employers, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA)
No. 130, July 6, 2000, at C-I (noting that this same "quiz" had resulted in lawsuits at both Morgan Stanley
and Citibank).
134. In re County of Ramsey, 114 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 993 (2000).
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harassment policy, despite the fact that none of the recipients of
the grievant's e-mails had complained.
The arbitrator re-instated the grievant without backpay,
converting his discharge into a nine-month unpaid
suspension, on the ground that he was a nine-year
employee with a clean record and that, despite the fact
that "what grievant did was wrong and should never be
allowed," the punishment imposed by the employer
was excessive compared to that imposed on others. 3 '
An employee of a public utility district was found, during a
sexual-harassment investigation of another employee, to have
approximately thirty-five "inappropriate" e-mails on his
computer, most in the form of jokes and cartoons. Although he
had not sent the e-mails to anyone who was offended by them,
he was discharged for violation of the employer's sexual
harassment policy.
The arbitrator ordered the grievant reinstated on the
ground that he had been denied due process because
the policy had previously been laxly enforced, the
employer had not followed its progressive discipline
policy, and discharge was an excessive penalty. The
arbitrator nonetheless acknowledged the importance of
the employer's policy
in protecting against sexual
36
harassment claims. 1

These cases are simply the visible tip of a very large iceberg. They arise
only when there is an actual or purported violation of an employer's policy
that leaves its tracks in a written decision. The vast majority of employees
heed their employers' warnings not to say anything that offends their fellow
workers. Thus, the most egregious censorship fostered by the hostileenvironment regime is not imposition of liability on employers for what is
often highly offensive speech by their employees or even discipline of
employees who violate their employers' harassment policies. Rather, it
consists of the day-to-day restrictions on the speech of millions of employees
who are likely never to be parties to a lawsuit - decent people who must walk
on eggshells because their employers have 3made
it clear that their jobs hang
7
in the balance if they say the wrong thing.

135. In re PPG Indus., Inc., 113 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 833 (2000).
136. In re Snohomish County Public Utility Dist. No. 1, 115 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 1 (2001).
137. The Supreme Court recognized the chilling effect that can occur in the workplace through vague
speech regulation in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 ("When one must guess what
conduct or utterance may lose him his position, one necessarily will 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone
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C. Are the Above Cases "Overreactions by ParanoidEmployers" or
Examples of the System Operatingthe Way it Is Supposed To
Operate?
The cases described above have certain elements in common. In each, the
employer disciplined or discharged an employee for expression that clearly
would not, by itself, constitute actionable harassment. Nonetheless, in the
majority of the cases, the employee ended up suffering some discipline even
after pursuing appeals. When the employees were completely successful in
their appeals, in almost all cases it was because of some procedural infirmity,
such as lack of notice or disproportionality in comparison with the treatment
of other employees. The legitimacy of the employer's taking
some action
138
against a properly warned employee is seldom challenged.
Some argue that when employers discipline employees for "subactionable" conduct, they are acting in a "paranoid" fashion3 9 or acting
pursuant to "bizarre" misapplications of the law."4 If employers are going
beyond what the law requires, the argument goes, their censorship cannot be
attributed to governmental action; instead, it is simply private action beyond
the reach of the First Amendment. While it is true that the actions of private
employers do not implicate the First Amendment if they are genuinely
privately motivated, the desire to avoid liability under a vague legal standard
is not "purely private" behavior.
Is it fair to say that when employers prohibit "sub-actionable" speech
they are over-reacting? Put another way, do employers have no legal
obligation to prohibit harassment prior to the point that it crosses the "severe
or pervasive" threshold? Presumably, everyone would agree that they have a
substantial legal incentive to do so, since several incidents of "sub-actionable"
speech can be aggregated under the totality-of-the-circumstances standard to
add up to a hostile environment. But the case can be made more strongly.
Suppose that there is some expression that by itself is sub-actionable but if
said three times will be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and
conditions of employment. When the offending employee says it the first
time, the employer tells the complaining employee, "That speech is not
.... ' For 'the threat of sanctions may deter... almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions."')
(citations omitted).
138. With changes in technology, employers are finding new ways to censor new media ofexpression.
Increasingly, employees have been fired for accessing pornographic websites or sending off-color or racially
offensive e-mails. Many employers use filters to block access to sexually oriented websites and to block emails with "inappropriate" content, and they are doing it for the purpose of avoiding harassment liability.
See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace, HarassmentLaw, and the ClintonAdministration,
63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 299, 309-10 (2000).
139. Sangree, supra note 78, at 595.
140. Epstein, supra note 21, at 418.
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sufficiently severe or pervasive as to constitute harassment; therefore I will
not prohibit him from saying it, and you should just 'toughen up."' When the
complaining employee complains about a second incident, the employer
responds in the same way. Then, it happens a third time, taking the
circumstances over the threshold of actionability. The complaining employee
may then quit and allege a constructive discharge or remain in employment
and sue. By hypothesis, a hostile environment exists, which means that the
employer's liability will turn on whether it has taken reasonable steps to
prevent harassment before it occurs and to remedy it once it has occurred. 4'
Our employer will have a hard time meeting this standard, given its repeated
refusal to act on the employee's complaints, and there is little doubt that it
would be held liable. What would its liability be based upon? Its prior failure
to stifle sub-actionable speech.
The employer's obligation to act in such circumstances has been clearly
recognized by the MSPB. Although acknowledging that an "isolated incident"
of "sexist" harassment will not result in employer liability, the Board has
stated:
[S]uch conduct by one of its supervisory employees cannot go
unchecked by the agency, lest the agency be said to condone such
remarks by its employees. Furthermore, if such conduct were not to
be held actionable, a course of conduct or pattern of discriminatory
behavior could emerge wherein the agency as employer could
ultimately be held liable under Title VI. 4 2
Employers of at-will employees labor under even fewer constraints than
public or unionized employers, because they need not even persuade an
administrative agency or arbitrator that acting prior to reaching the legal
standard for harassment is justified. Again, the incentives are overwhelmingly
on the side of over-regulation.
Arguably, this analysis might change as a result of the Supreme Court's
recentper curiamdecision in ClarkCounty School Districtv. Breeden.143 The
plaintiff in Breeden had complained that her supervisor had laughed
inappropriately about an off-color comment made by a job applicant in his

141. See White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Corrections, 221 F.3d 254, 261 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating
that employer is liable for co-worker harassment if the employer "knew or should have known of the
charged sexual harassment and failed to implement prompt and appropriate corrective action"); Hafford
v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 513 (6th Cir..1999) (same).
142. Curry v. Dep't of the Navy, 13 M.S.P.R. 326, 330 (1982); see also Carosella v. United States
Postal Serv., 816 F.2d 638,643 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that "[a]n employer is not required to tolerate the
disruption and inefficiencies caused by a hostile workplace environment until the wrongdoer has so clearly
violated the law that the victims are sure to prevail in a Title VII action").
143. 121 S.Ct. 1508 (2001).
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prior job; shortly thereafter, the plaintiff was transferred to another position.
She contended that the transfer constituted unlawful retaliation under section
704 of Title VII.'" Although agreeing with the District Court that this one
incident was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute unlawful
harassment, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the employer.'45 It reasoned that section 704 protects not
just complaints about practices that are actually unlawful but also practices
that the employee reasonably but erroneously believes to be unlawful.' 46
Thus, the Ninth Circuit held, her opposition was protected "if she had a
reasonable good faith belief that the incident involving the sexually explicit
remark constituted unlawful sexual harassment."'' 47 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that even if the Ninth Circuit was correct in protecting
opposition to conduct that is reasonably but erroneously believed to be
unlawful, "no one could reasonably believe that the incident.., violated Title
VII." 148

On its face, the Supreme Court's decision makes perfect sense. Surely
Title VII does not protect all employee complaints, no matter how
unreasonable, that an employer's conduct violates Title VII. Outside the
harassment area, such a rule poses little problem. If a woman repeatedly
complains, for example, that the employer is engaged in sex discrimination
because male executives earn more than female clerical staff, the policies
behind Title VII are not significantly implicated if the employer tells her to
quit complaining and imposes sanctions against her if she does not. In the
harassment context, with its "severe or pervasive" standard, however, this
reasoning presents problems. If the anti-retaliation provisions are not
triggered until harassing conduct becomes severe or pervasive enough to be
actionable - or at least until a reasonable person could believe that it was then that implies that an employer could respond to a woman's good-faith
complaints about sub-actionable harassment by firing her, at least as long as
it did not single out discrimination complaints for such harsh treatment. This
result - bringing new meaning to the phrase "nipping harassment in the bud"
- seems inconsistent with a regime that is designed to encourage employers
to adopt anti-harassment policies and to encourage employees to take
advantage of the policies.

144. Id. at 1509 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994) (making it unlawful "for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees ... because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by [Title VII]").
145. Breeden, 121 S.Ct.at 1511.
146. Id. at 1510.
147. Id. at 1509 (citation omitted).
148. Id.
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If employers are now authorized to discharge employees for their first
complaint of harassment as long as it is sub-actionable, then it is somewhat
incongruous to suggest that they have an obligation to remedy sub-actionable
harassment when it occurs or that their failure to do so can be used against
them in subsequent litigation. It would be an odd rule that allows employers
to fire employees for complaints of sub-actionable harassment but that
punishes employers for failing to remedy that harassment in the event that
enough harassment occurs subsequently to push the totality of the
circumstances into the realm of illegality.
A predictable result of Breeden, if it remains good law, is that courts will
lower the bar of what a reasonable person might think constitutes actionable
harassment in order to protect women who complain about their workplace
conditions. Many courts would be uncomfortable ruling, for example, that a
woman who is fired after complaining about the presence of a single pin-up
calendar in the workplace is without a remedy, even though the calendar
would not by itself suffice to create employer liability. Under Breeden, in
order to find the complaint protected, however, a court would have to find that
a reasonable person could believe that a single pin-up violates Title VII. If a
reasonable person could believe that a single pin-up violates Title VII, then
that further implies that a hostile-environment claim based upon a single pinup should go to trial, rather than being resolved on summary judgment in favor
of the employer, as it would be today. After all, if reasonable minds could
differ over the question, then it is ordinarily a jury question whether a hostile
environment exists. Unfortunately, the Court did not discuss any of the
implications of its decision." 9
IV. RAISING THE FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE: THE EEOC GUIDELINES,
AS INTERPRETED BY COURTS, ARE VOID ON THEIR FACE

Most of the focus of court opinions and academic debate has centered on
the question whether hostile-environment speech regulation is permitted by
virtue of some doctrinal category, such as the captive-audience doctrine or
time, place, or manner doctrine. In some sense, this debate may be largely
beside the point, because even if much of the speech can be shoe-homed into
one or another of such categories, the standard under which the speech is
regulated must satisfy more general First Amendment rules, such as those
relating to vagueness and overbreadth, and the hostile-environment standard
cannot do so.

149. The Court's apparent failure to consider the full implications of its decision is a predictable
consequence of its unfortunate practice of occasionally deciding cases, as here, without benefit of briefs
on the merits, oral argument, or the amicus briefs that a case like this would ordinarily generate.
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The primary way that employers have so far raised the First Amendment
challenge has been to make the general argument that because some or all of
the complained-of "conduct" in the case constitutes speech, imposition of
liability would violate the First Amendment. Despite ample doctrinal support
for that argument, courts have not been very receptive to the invitation to
decide whether the speech at issue - which may be quite offensive - should
be placed in the "protected" or "unprotected" category.
An alternative approach, and one that may hold more promise, is to raise
a facial challenge to the law. Rather than defending the specific speech at
issue in the case, the employer would challenge the legal standard on grounds
of both vagueness and overbreadth, shifting the focus to where it belongs - on
the vague and overbroad regulatory standard that forces employers to censor
speech that should be immune from government regulation.
A. Vagueness
A central principle of First Amendment doctrine is that any law
regulating speech must give reasonable notice of what is prohibited. A vague
law restricts too much speech, because "[u]ncertain meanings inevitably lead
citizens to steer far wide of the unlawful zone."'"5 A vague law creates a
"chilling effect," such that individuals will stifle not only their expression of
appropriately prohibited speech but also their expression of protected speech
that comes anywhere close to the line because of their inability to perceive
with confidence where the line is. 5 '
The legal standard governing harassment liability provides little guidance
about what speech is actionable. The EEOC Guidelines define harassment as
"verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature [that] has the purpose or effect
of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment."' 5 2 The Supreme
Court, when characterizing its holdings, has tended to use the phrase "hostile
or abusive" to describe the actionable work environment, 5 3 perhaps to
reinforce its view that mere "offense" is not enough to create liability.' The
Court has further added the gloss that the harassment must be "severe or

150. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972).
151. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,433 (1963).
152. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1999).
153. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,21 (1993); MeritorSav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 66 (1986).
154. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (stating that "mere utterance of an ...epithet which engenders
offensive feelings in a employee does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to implicate Title
VII") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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pervasive,"' 5 a determination that is to be made "by looking at all the
circumstances.', 1 6 Moreover, despite the EEOC Guidelines' inclusion of
verbal conduct having the "purpose or effect" of creating a hostile
environment, the Supreme Court has defined the hostile environment only in
terms of its effect, stating that the environment must be one that "a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive" and that the victim must "subjectively
perceive the environment to be abusive."' s7 Despite these limitations,
however, the question of liability is, as Justice Scalia's Harrisconcurrence
observed, decided by "virtually unguided juries."'5 8 While such an unclear
standard may be acceptable in some contexts, when it comes to regulation of
speech, "precision of regulation is demanded."'5 9
B. Overbreadth
The indeterminacy of the liability standard coupled with the totality-ofthe-circumstances rule and the regime of employer liability"6 eliminates, in
a perverse way, the vagueness of the standard by which employers are to
gauge their obligation to stifle employee speech. The law pressures employers
to censor all speech that is sexist or sexual, even if no one has complained
about it. If litigation ensues, the employer's liability will be judged in large
part by how vigilant it has been in policing sexually charged speech and
conduct. So understood, hostile-environment law can be seen to impose clear
obligations 6that are sweeping in their prohibition of speech and thus fatally
overbroad.' '
From a litigation perspective, the substantial overbreadth of the legal
standard is a potential boon to employers, because under Supreme Court
precedent a litigant challenging an overbroad restriction on speech is not
required to demonstrate that his own speech could not be regulated by an
appropriately tailored statute." Thus, an employer need not demonstrate that
the speech relied upon by a sexual-harassment plaintiff is "protected" from
any conceivable regulation; it is sufficient that the employer demonstrate that

155. Id. at 22.
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157. Id. at21-22.
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159. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,916 (1982) (citation and internal quotation
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160. See supra Section 1H(A).
161. See Robert A. Sedler, The First Amendment in the Workplace: Private Free Speech vs. Legal
Protections Against Discrimination, LAB. & EMP. LAWNOTES, at 7 (1996); Gerard, supra note 77.
162. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
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the law's overbreadth is not only "real, but substantial as well, judged in
'
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." 163
If the law clearly set forth what virtually all employment lawyers and
judges appear to think it requires of employers, the facial invalidity of the law
would be plain. Imagine a statute that explicitly prohibited employees from
engaging in the following expressions in the workplace: stating that women
do not belong in male-dominated occupations; 64 possessing National
Lampoon or67Penthouse;'65wearing "Hooters Restaurant" t-shirts;166ridiculing
"ebonics"; and circulating David Hackworth columns critical of women in
combat. 6 8 One doubts that a single First Amendment scholar or judge could
be found who would vouch for the constitutionality of the statute.
Hostile-environment regulation is a classic example of the rationale for
allowing overbreadth challenges under the First Amendment despite the
general rule that "a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied
will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may
conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others.' 6 9 Claims that a law is
facially overbroad are permitted because of the belief that "the possible harm
to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted
and perceived grievances left to fester because of the possible inhibitory
effects of overly broad statutes."' 70 The millions of employees who must
censor themselves every day because their employers have made clear that a
desire to avoid harassment liability has led them to have "zero tolerance" for
offensive speech are unlikely to be in a position to raise their own First
Amendment rights and thus must rely on their employers to do so.
Courts have been relatively receptive to facial challenges to public-sector
harassment policies, having shown themselves willing to strike them down in
both declaratory actions' 7' and actions challenging discipline imposed under
the policies.' 72 In public-sector cases, it is not necessary to determine whether
the policy was adopted to comply with the law or whether it goes beyond what
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the law would require. In Dambrot v. Central Michigan University,173 for
example, the plaintiff basketball coach had been discharged for using the word
"nigger" in motivational sessions with his players.' 74 Although his use of the
word was not intended to offend the players,' 75 the university maintained that
he had violated its discriminatory harassment policy. That policy defined
racial and ethnic harassment as follows:
any intentional, unintentional, physical, verbal, or nonverbal behavior
that subjects an individual to an intimidating, hostile or offensive
educational, employment or living environment by... (c) demeaning
or slurring individuals through... written literature because of their
racial or ethnic affiliation; or (d)using symbols, [ep
ithets] or slogans that infer negative
connotations about the
76
individual's racial or ethnic affiliation.
Dambrot challenged his discharge on the ground that the harassment policy
was facially unconstitutional. The district court agreed, and the court of
appeals affirmed.
The court of appeals reasoned that the harassment policy was both vague
and overbroad.' The policy did not provide fair notice of what speech was
prohibited, and on its face reached a substantial amount of constitutionally
protected speech.'78 Regardless of the political value of the speech, the court
reasoned, the policy allowed the university to prohibit the speech on the basis
of subjective judgments about what speech was "negative" or "offensive.' 79
Similarly, in Saxe v. State College Area School District,80 the Third
Circuit found a public school district's harassment policy to be facially
overbroad. The policy provided in part:
Harassment means verbal or physical conduct based on one's actual
or perceived race, religion, color, national origin, gender, sexual
orientation, disability, or other personal characteristics, and which has
the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with a student's

173. Dambrot, 55 F.3d at 1177.
174. Id. at 1180-81.
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educational performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or
offensive environment.' 8'
The policy also stated that harassment "can include any unwelcome verbal,
written or physical conduct which offends, denigrates or belittles an individual
because of any of the characteristics described above" and that religious
harassment is "unwelcome verbal, written or physical conduct directed at the
characteristics of a person's religion, such as derogatory comments regarding
surnames, religious tradition, or religious clothing, or religious slurs, or
graffiti."' 8 2
According to the Third Circuit, "[t]here is no categorical 'harassment
exception' to the First Amendment." '83 No one, the court stated, "would
suggest that a school could constitutionally ban 'any unwelcome verbal...
conduct which offends . . .an individual because of some enumerated
personal characteristics."'8 4 Moreover, the court observed, the policy defined
harassment as conduct having either the purpose or effect of creating a hostile
environment (just as the EEOC Guidelines do), whereas the Supreme Court's
cases define harassment solely by its effects.8 5 Therefore, notwithstanding
the latitude that schools have to regulate the speech of students, the policy had
a far broader reach than the Constitution would allow.
The policies struck down in Dambrot and Saxe are very similar to the
EEOC Guidelines and the case law that has relied upon those Guidelines, as
well as to the policies adopted by many employers in both the private and
public sector pursuant to their understanding of the dictates of Title VII.
Dambrot and Saxe, therefore, provide strong ammunition for the conclusion
that hostile-environment law is facially invalid.
The difficulty with mounting a facial challenge to federal harassment law
is that it is based on an amalgam of statute, administrative guidelines, and case
law. The underlying statutory provision is quite plainly not invalid under the
First Amendment, as it simply prohibits sex discrimination.8 6 The EEOC
Guidelines, while influential, do not have the force of law. 87 That leaves the
interpretive case law, much of it from the Supreme Court, as the primary legal
directive to employers to engage in censorship. The fact that facial invalidity
can be avoided by a limiting construction' 8 suggests that anyone challenging
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the facial validity of harassment law is likely to face a moving target. This
difficulty would not be faced in a federal-court challenge to the many state
anti-discrimination laws that effectively codify the EEOC Guidelines. 8 9
V. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT REGIME

If First Amendment protections are not to fall victim to the war on
harassment, it must be harassment doctrine, rather than constitutional doctrine,
that must change. One possibility is to narrow actionable harassment to
speech that is "directly targeted" toward the plaintiff, so that such undirected
expression as cartoons posted on a wall or jokes inadvertently overheard will
not support liability. A more promising, yet more radical, possibility is to
eliminate employer liability altogether.
A. Directly Targeted Speech
Some commentators, while believing that current harassment standards
unduly restrict expression, have argued that First Amendment problems can
be avoided by requiring that speech be "targeted" toward a particular victim
in order to be actionable." 9 Thus, a plaintiff could not rely on overheard jokes
or objectionable displays that are exhibited for all to see. Such a standard
would unquestionably be an improvement over the current standard, but faith
in this revised standard reflects the view that a law is working appropriately
if the right parties are prevailing in the litigated cases. The relevant question,
however, is whether a "targeted" standard would substantially reduce the core
problem of hostile-environment regulation, which is censorship by employers
because of fear of liability. The answer appears to be in the negative.
Under any sensible interpretation of a "targeted" standard, statements
that were intentionally made in the plaintiff's presence would qualify even if
they were not formally directed toward her. That is, if a woman overhears
sexist jokes or remarks and asserts that they were made because of her
presence, it would presumably be ajury question whether the statements were
in fact "targeted." Similarly, if a woman argues that suggestive pictures were
posted specifically to offend her, she may be able to get to a jury on her claim.
Of course, if the picture predated her employment in that location, such a
claim would be hard to make. However, if she complained about the first
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picture after she entered the workplace and then additional pictures were
posted, she might reasonably argue that the later pictures were directed at her
in retaliation for her earlier complaints.
A "targeted" standard would simply not provide the employer the tools
for distinguishing between the speech it must regulate and the speech it may
allow. Many of the cases described in Section HI could plausibly be
characterized as involving "targeted" speech. While not sufficient by itself to
create liability, the speech in each of those cases could potentially be
aggregated with other speech to support a hostile-environment finding. Thus,
the employer would still experience the same pressure to censor the speech,
so that even a "targeted" standard would still require the employer to impose
viewpoint-based speech restrictions.
B. Elimination of Employer Liability
A substantially superior way of regulating harassment - at least
harassment that takes the form of speech - would be to eliminate employer
liability under Title VII and rely on tort actions against harassers themselves
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 91 Such a course would
diminish employer incentives to over-censor employee speech. Employers
would nonetheless retain an interest in restricting the most egregious forms of
harassment because of their interest in workplace efficiency, but the huge
incentives to hypersensitivity would diminish. Thus, employers would still
draw lines, but they would probably draw them in a way that would be more
protective of the expression of their employees.
At the same time, individual liability would have the advantage of
imposing liability on the primary malefactor, who would risk substantial
economic sanctions for highly abusive speech. There is reason to think that
jurors would be more speech-protective in an action against a co-worker than
in an action against a deep-pocket corporate employer. The impulse to selfcensorship would not be as great, because employees would know that they
would be held liable only for their own speech. Thus, they would not have to
be concerned about whether the speech of others could be added to their own
to create liability, unless they were acting in concert with the other employees.
A system of individual liability would mitigate many of the most
pernicious aspects of current regulation - the cumulation of speech of
numerous speakers and the system of third-party censorship. It is not,
however, a panacea. The "outrageous conduct" element of the intentional
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infliction of emotional distress tort suffers some of the same vagueness
problems that the current hostile-environment standard suffers. In overturning
a tort award obtained by Jerry Falwell against Hustlermagazine, the Supreme
Court held that the "outrageousness" standard was insufficiently precise.' 92
The Court stated that "'[o]utrageousness' in the area of political and social
discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to
impose liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the
basis of their dislike of a particular expression."' 93 . Although the Court's
solicitude for First Amendment values was heightened by the fact that Jerry
Falwell is a public figure, the standard provides no more or less guidance
depending upon the status of the plaintiff. Moreover, the speech at issue in
many sexual and racial harassment cases raises a significant likelihood that
jurors would do exactly what the Court feared in Hustler: impose liability
based upon their own tastes and upon their dislike of certain kinds of speech.
VI. CONCLUSION
The First Amendment issue will continue to arise, but in the cases in
which employers are most likely to raise it, they are least likely to need it that is, in cases like DeAngelis where the court thinks that the harassment was
not really very bad. In more serious cases, most courts will probably continue
to feel strong pressures to disregard the issue because when there is a lot of
speech that a court thinks unprotected, or when there is speech mixed with bad
conduct, courts will view the First Amendment issue as a smokescreen.
Eventually, however, the Supreme Court will have to address the issue, and
when it does it will find that it cannot endorse the status quo without
dramatically modifying First Amendment doctrine.
Many people are troubled by invocation of the First Amendment to
protect speech that is in many cases so self-evidently of little value at best, and
affirmatively harmful at worst. However, the perceived harmfulness of
harassing speech does not distinguish it from any other speech that might be
the subject of regulation. The expression targeted by regulation is always
thought to be harmful - whether it be speech of Communists, nude dancing,
flag burning, solicitation in airports, protesting against a war, or pornography.
If the First Amendment did not impose costs by requiring us to endure speech
we would rather avoid, it would not be worth having. That we must endure
such speech is not an unpleasant side effect of the First Amendment; it is its
core purpose.
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